Does Religious Extremism cause Religious Conflict?

This is a ~2.5k word essay written for the module SE3211: Ethnicity and Religion in Southeast Asia exploring the relationship between religious extremism and religious conflict at the inter- and intra-religious level through case studies. I stand by my argument that at the end of the day, religion is but one factor in a person's psyche. Even with an ideology/ belief that one holds fast to, this ideology can manifest in many ways, be it through violence or diplomacy. How it is practised is influenced by many other factors often unaccounted for. Thank you for reading my essay if you do! Grade: A

Can religious conflict (whether inter or intra) be explained by the rise of religious extremism? Why?

“This is a Religious War”, was a title of an article published by the New York Times Magazine in 2001 (Sullivan, 2001).  It not only declared the religious dimension as central to aggression and conflict post 9/11, it also expressed apprehension for faiths of all kinds with creeping levels of religious extremism.

This raises two questions that frame this paper’s argument. How ‘religious’ are these religious conflicts, or to put in another way, what is the basis for religious conflict, and is it caused by religious extremism?

This paper will argue that the rise of religious extremism does not fully explain for the occurrence of both inter-religious and intra-religious conflict, as the basis for religious conflict is hardly a religious one. As such, it is religious extremism tied with other external non-religious factors that deepen the schism between a much broader sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. For inter-religious conflicts such as the Christian minority in Malaysia, identity and conflict are often to do with issues of ethnicity and nationalism. For intra-religious conflicts such as the persecution of Shias in an ASWJ-dominated Malaysia, it is commonly linked to the threat of political ideology and authority.

However, in comparing the characteristics of inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts, inter-religious conflicts are more susceptible to escalation with the rise of religious extremism due to (1) greater perceived differences with its inextricable ties to ethnicity and (2) greater salience with the rise of globalization and media that effectively deepen the schism between “’us’ and ‘them’, breeding the grounds for conflict.

Religious Extremism, Identity and Conflict

There is little consensus on the definition of religious extremism. This term is commonly used to refer to fundamentalism, radicalism and fanaticism. For the purposes of this paper, it will define religious extremism as the desire to increase the strictness, detail and scope of religious law and practice. This can take the form of a process or an institution. 

While the rise in religious extremism can culminate in violent acts such as terrorism and ethnic genocide, it can also mean that more people are behaving in a more religiously extreme fashion or that there is an increase in numbers and/or influence of religiously extreme groups (Liebman, 1983). Underlying these are reinforced ideas, perceptions and consciousness of the religious self – and inadvertently the non-religious self. These identities are split between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality that is at the heart of conflict.

Many conflicts contain identity-based components, but are often not immediately observable or acknowledged (Wondolleck, Gray, Bryan, 2003). Therefore, while tempting to simply draw boundaries along religious lines, one cannot assume these categories to be static, primordial and self-explanatory. As much as extremists “live in but not of the world”, religion and its members do not exist in a vacuum and are not immune to sociological, cultural and political forces. While acknowledging fundamental theological differences, identities of the self and perception of the other is an amalgamation and blend of stereotypes, contextual influences aspirations and values, where religion is but one factor in identity and conflict (Wondolleck, Gray, Bryan, 2003). Using cases of inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts, the next two sections seeks to elaborate on the stronger non-religious dimension fueling ‘religious’ conflict that religious extremism cannot solely account for.

The section following will evaluate how inter- and intra-religious identity and conflict is perceived and framed to conclude that the nature of inter-religious conflict is more vulnerable to escalation with the rise of religious extremism.

Inter-religious Conflicts; Not Just a Religious Conflict

The Kelabit and Lun Bawang are Christian minorities in a Muslim-dominated Malaysia. Numerically inferior and geographically distant from the center of the Peninsula, the Kelabit and Lun Bawang perceive a growing disadvantage with the state-sponsored Islamic revival throughout Malaysia (Bala, 2014). However, the sense of unease and threat that arises in the face of growing extremism is undergirded by their feelings of ethnic, cultural and political disadvantage. While article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution acknowledges the freedom to practice one’s religion, Malaysia is not a secular state and officially recognizes Islam as the religion of the Federation. What is notable is that this conceptualization of Islam is heavily intertwined with ethnicity. Article 160 declares that to be recognized as a “Malay”, the ethnically dominant group, one must practice religion, along with speaking the Malay language and conforming to Malay custom. This additional emphasis on the Malay ethnicity, language and culture that must be embraced by the Muslim creates a double-barreled but inextricably infused Malay-Muslim identity. The notion of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) gives preferential treatment under the law to Malay Muslims, such as promotion and scholarship, at the expense of other ethnic groups. As a result, the move towards more extreme Islamization causes fears such as Christian’s decreasing role in the national integration discourse and its implications on their legal system, education, culture and general way of life, beyond the concern of the freedom to practice one’s religion (Bala, 2014). While clashes have yet to be realized, there are real concerns festering amongst Christians that are not only on Islamic dominance but of Malay racial and cultural superiority. 

Intra-religious Conflicts; Not Just a Religious Conflict

The state seeks to support a homogenous version of Islam, Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) and takes a harsh stance against other Islamic variants such as Shiism, resorting to legal and authoritative means to detain those it deems as ‘deviant’. Despite the individual’s freedom to practice their own religion enshrined in the constitution, this right and religious tolerance is not extended to the Shias by the religious authorities. While part of the conflict is based on growing intolerance towards differing religious theology, the manner in which the state approaches Shias is less as a religious conflict but more as a national security issue and a threat to political and religious authorities. Interestingly, the arrest of 200 Muslims in 2010 who were members of an allegedly Shia-leaning religious group was managed through the Internal Security Act (ISA) and not by handled by the shari’a court that typically attends to the religious affairs in Malaysia.  They were detained for reasons such as hindering religious harmony and Malaysia’s political and economic development (Juan, 2014). Two interesting contradictions can be drawn from this. Firstly, given the few and insignificant numbers of Shias both internationally and in Malaysia, they numerically pose little threat to the nation’s security that does not justify the disproportionate amount of given to the dangerous presence of these radicals. Secondly, this exclusive treatment towards the Shias is contradictory to the religious principles taught in the Qu’ran on Islam. Islam emphasizes the value of diversity and inclusivity both to people of different religions and even of different opinions. The persecution of Shias goes against the pluralism preached in Islam and are not theologically justified, challenging the religious basis of conflict.

Rather, one can postulate that Shiism poses a threat to ASWJ’s Islam-dominated political ideology and authority, less so the religious one. Religious divisions of “ASWJ” and “Shias” are less so at the crux of the conflict, but serve as categories that have only recently been politically and practically constructed through a process of selective reading on Islamic scholarship, history and opinion (Juan, 2014). A greater display of religious extremism, therefore, does not fully encapsulate these political agendas and concerns that exist beneath simple issues of theological incompatibility.

Us vs Them Identity Frames

As argued above, the rise in religious extremism does not directly cause religious conflict for both inter-religious conflict and intra-religious conflict. Instead, I propose that in knowing how dynamic identity frames can be understood, we are then better able to compare whether inter-religious conflict or intra-religious conflict are more likely to worsen with the rise of religious extremism. While there are some inherently incompatible identities and truths within each specific religion that cannot be reconciled with, for the most part, religious identities only remain descriptive, fairly neutral and are not mobilized until it is framed in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Wondolleck, Gray, Bryan, 2003). Framing has a large influence over how people view themselves vis-à-vis the other, that has great potential to start – or subdue – conflict. This dynamic nature of identity frames has two characteristics.

Firstly, identity is very dependent on external circumstances and contextual changes. Factors extrinsic to said identity can influence one’s perception of the self and the other. As explained above, religious conflict and identities may not always be about religion but based on other factors such as nationalism, ethnicity, geography, institutions such as the constitution and the governance under the state. In the case of the Kelabit and Lun Bawang Christian minorities, many are wary of the special privilege given to ethnically Malay, that is enshrined in the constitution.

Secondly, these external circumstances impact the salience of an identity. Although individuals normally carry multiple identities, such as a male, a mother, a son, a graduate student, a lawyer, a Muslim, one’s external environment can heighten the salience of an identity. The more or less salient an identity becomes can effectively escalate or subside conflicts. State-sponsored violence, police brutality against an ethnic group, an armed rebellion and even the presence of media can play a large role in influencing the salience of an identity.

Identity and conflict can transform rapidly during times of crisis – including the rise of religious extremism – depending on the form it takes and the nature of identities present. It is therefore too simplistic to say that a shift towards greater religiosity would necessarily lead to greater religious conflict. The last section will evaluate the nature of inter-religious and intra-religious conflict with the framework of dynamic identity frames that are contextually dependent and subject to salience to conclude which is more vulnerable to religious extremism.

Comparing Inter-Religious and Intra-Religious Conflicts

Intra-religious conflicts are created when there are differing theological convictions, world views and religious understandings of social order existing within single religious communities. Intra-religious rivalries and competition can factionalize religious communities into different sects and denominations, lead under religious elites. Their main goals are usually to forward their theological positions and improve their access to organizational and material resources (Juan, 2014). However, for the case of Shiism in Malaysia, it is unlikely that conflict between Shias and ASWJ will escalate even with the rise of greater state-sanctioned religious extremism.

Firstly, the dominant ASWJ version of Islam is heavily supported and safeguarded by the state. This is evidenced with the greater centralization of the ulama (Muslim scholars) in Islamic religious bureaucracies to formulate “Islamic” policies and fatwa and bring society back to the orthodox Islamic doctrines of ASWJ. Due to this environment of heavy state regulation of Islam, this gives Shiism and its followers very little salience and space to expand. 

Secondly, due to the complex overlap of the Malay ethnicity and Islam, it would be harder to tell Muslim-Malay followers from a sect of Islam like Shiism apart from other ASWJ, who also speak the Malay language and follow Malay customs – at least from the surface level. Intra-religious communities share more commonalities than inter-religious communities would and conflicts would be easier to resolve in the face of religious extremism as the perceived differences are lesser.

Conversely, inter-religious conflicts are arguably more volatile with greater religious extremism. Compared to other countries, there is relatively lesser inter-religious conflicts in Malaysia despite the Malay-Muslim majority and narrative of racial superiority, or at least for violent conflicts. Most religious conflicts take place in the legal sphere. At the very least, it can be argued that religious conflict has not yet reached boiling point as there are avenues for political expression. In contrast, the Rohingyas, an ethnic and Muslim minority in Myanmar, resorted to violence because of their lack of political and citizenship rights.

In the case of the Kelabit and Lun Bawang Christians, it could also be said that due to its geographical distance from the Peninsula center, it does not face the brunt of Islamization policies (Saat, 2014).  

However, the inter-religious conflicts receive a lot more attention than intra-religious conflict due to the media and forces of globalization that creates divisive narratives of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Media is often quick to sensationalize any kind of antagonism, often relating it to religion as the source of conflict. Moreover, religious violence has been gaining more global attention post 9/11. All these factors serve to increase the salience of especially inter-religious identities, that makes it vulnerable to escalation and friction when any form of religious extremism is identified. 

  

Conclusion

While this paper has not sufficiently considered the outcome of religious cohesion – rather than religious conflict – with the rise of religious extremism, it recognizes the possibility. It has also focused on more top-down state-led forms of religious extremism.

This paper has argued that the rise in religious extremism is insufficient in explaining for inter-religious conflict and intra-religious conflict, as very often, these conflicts are fueled by many other non-religious factors that are overlooked and not accounted for. Beyond religious identities, it applied the broader concept of identity between ‘us’ and ‘them’ its dynamic identity frames to explain for the different levels of conflict. These frames are subject to its external environment which gives it a degree of saliency, upon which conflicts are – or are not – acted upon. It concluded that inter-religious conflicts have a higher tendency to escalate in times of religious extremism given a greater perceived difference, the media and globalization.

Words: 2426

Bibliography

Bala, P. (2014). 19. Being Christians in Muslim-majority Malaysia: The Kelabit and Lun Bawang Experiences in Sarawak. Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority States in Southeast Asia, 379–399. doi: 10.1355/9789814519656-022

Juan, A. D. (2014). The Role of Intra-Religious Conflicts in Intrastate Wars. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(4), 762–780. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2013.856781

Liebman, C. S. (1983). Extremism as a Religious Norm. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 22(1), 75. doi: 10.2307/1385593

Saat, N. (2014). 18. “Deviant” Muslims: The Plight of Shias in Contemporary Malaysia. Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority States in Southeast Asia, 359–378. doi: 10.1355/9789814519656-021

Sullivan, A. (2001, October 7). This Is a Religious War. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/magazine/this-is-a-religious-war.html.

Wondolleck, J. M., Gray, B., & Bryan, T. (2003). Us versus Them: How Identities and Characterizations Influence Conflict. Environmental Practice, 5(3), 207–213. doi: 10.1017/s1466046603035592

Wondolleck, J. M., Gray, B., & Bryan, T. (2003). Us versus Them: How Identities and Characterizations Influence Conflict. Environmental Practice, 5(3), 207–213. doi: 10.1017/s1466046603035592

Reflection: Nudity and Sexuality in Japan

Title: Nudity and Sexuality in Japan (June, 2019)

A short reflection piece written in my 7 weeks stay in Japan!

Typically, a quick impression of Japanese people that comes to my mind is their humble, modest and conservative nature. Never boisterous, never proud. Always conscious of how they present themselves in the public setting. However, this image I had was slightly distorted in my first ever experience to the Onsen.

The journey to being stark naked in the Onsen was a long one. On our field trip to Nikko, we were informed that the hotel was known for its onsen bathhouses for its guests. Many, although slightly weary, were generally excited to try it. I was however mortified at the very prospect of parading around in my birthday suit. I made up my mind long ago that if I ever were to go to an onsen, I absolutely needed to be alone. Not even being around family would waver my stance.

It was not the hours of convincing and mild coercive threats received from my peers that changed my mind. Instead, what finally made me give in was the onsen appetizer I experienced at this Ashiya (public foot baths) near the Kinugawaonsen station. Our casual venture beyond the hotel premises led us to this foot bath not too far off. Shocked to find that it was free and open to the public, we immediately helped ourselves to a seat and dipped out feet into the lukewarm water. A loud sigh of relief accompanies it, as if all the troubles in the world melted away. I knew in that moment that I wanted – no, needed – the full-body experience. I made eye-contact with a friend who was previously equally resistant on trying the onsen. We shared a wistful look that conveyed the same thought; “Guess we have no other choice”.

After much procrastination of doing every other possible thing we could do in the hotel, it was finally time to face my fear. I had heard that we could bring a towel into the hot bath. However, I was told that it was so small it essentially covered nothing. Perhaps because it was never meant to be a tool for modesty, but to wrap around your head to keep your hair dry.

That didn’t stop us gaijins from trying though. In the changing room preluding to the actual onsen, we took the bigger towel not meant to be brought into the onsen. However, we were stopped by one of the staff who redirected us to the smaller towel. Abashedly, we obliged and were forced to reveal naked bodies to one another, with the small towel being of no help whatsoever.

The dash from the changing room to the onsen was humiliating. The more we tried to hide, the more pathetic it felt, especially when many other unfazed locals around us were leisurely strolling past us, stark naked and unashamedly showcasing their assets. Eventually, I got tired of keeping up the covering act and forced myself to maintain normal conversations with my friends. By the end of our baths, we too found ourselves casually strolling back to the changing room – as did the locals – not in any desperation to reunite with our clothes. Something about being stripped to absolutely nothing made for very intimate conversations. Moreover, the onsen environment really helped to facilitate deeper conversations, despite only having recently befriended the girls with me.

On hindsight, I am glad that the towel warden had stopped us from covering ourselves up with the big towels. If we had insisted on our own gaijin ways, we would never have had the true Japanese Onsen experience – in which expression of nudity was part of the package. 

By putting ourselves outside of our comfort zones, we maximized our experience here in Japan. The towel warden in that moment became the cultural enforcer, that taught us the value of “when in Rome, do as Romans do”. Participating in the process – entirely as it was meant to be – rather than bringing in our own cultural assumptions, beliefs of right and wrongs, is the first step to understanding any kind of society and group. Perhaps this is the very value of ethnography.

Another aspect I have heavily encountered in Japanese society is the excessive exposure to sexuality. Walking past a middle-aged man browsing a wide-opened A4-sized hentai manga big enough for the blind to see in the middle of the bustling Shibuya train platform was something I didn't see every day. Or, ever. Also, my hunt for generic otaku merchandise at Akihabara led me similar buildings with floors 5-7 reserved exclusively for mature audiences. Of course, in the name of science, I had to explore every nook and cranny on every floor. It was fascinating how overt pornographic materials were displayed. I even witnessed a museum-like room, where drawn naked girls were very professionally framed up.

This made me very curious as to the way sexuality and nudity operate in Japan. Most of the world had experienced western colonization for a sustained period of time - and with it, had received western-influenced religious values – enough for them to take some root in the fabric of moral society. Western religions often discourage sexuality. However, these western values never had enough traction to make a significant impact on moral society in Japan, that was and still is largely organized by Shinto and Buddhist principles. Shinto religion, on the other hand, is more open-minded to concepts of sexuality that focuses more on the importance of the divine power of deities (kami) rather than the moral actions of the individual. Even as Buddhism and Shintoism blend into Japanese beliefs, they often do not condemn most forms of sexuality.

The Japanese, therefore, abide by a different set of moral codes; where sexuality and nudity are not seen as inherently shameful. Of course, that does not mean that all Japanese people fully embrace it. Instead, I conceive that nudity and sexuality are viewed in the pragmatic lens as socially disruptive, less so viewed in the moral lens as inherently wrong.