Monday 21 October 2019

Reflection: Nudity and Sexuality in Japan


Title: Nudity and Sexuality in Japan (June, 2019)

A short reflection piece written in my 7 weeks stay in Japan!



Typically, a quick impression of Japanese people that comes to my mind is their humble, modest and conservative nature. Never boisterous, never proud. Always conscious of how they present themselves in the public setting. However, this image I had was slightly distorted in my first ever experience to the Onsen.

The journey to being stark naked in the Onsen was a long one. On our field trip to Nikko, we were informed that the hotel was known for its onsen bathhouses for its guests. Many, although slightly weary, were generally excited to try it. I was however mortified at the very prospect of parading around in my birthday suit. I made up my mind long ago that if I ever were to go to an onsen, I absolutely needed to be alone. Not even being around family would waver my stance.

It was not the hours of convincing and mild coercive threats received from my peers that changed my mind. Instead, what finally made me give in was the onsen appetizer I experienced at this Ashiya (public foot baths) near the Kinugawaonsen station. Our casual venture beyond the hotel premises led us to this foot bath not too far off. Shocked to find that it was free and open to the public, we immediately helped ourselves to a seat and dipped out feet into the lukewarm water. A loud sigh of relief accompanies it, as if all the troubles in the world melted away. I knew in that moment that I wanted – no, needed – the full-body experience. I made eye-contact with a friend who was previously equally resistant on trying the onsen. We shared a wistful look that conveyed the same thought; “Guess we have no other choice”.

After much procrastination of doing every other possible thing we could do in the hotel, it was finally time to face my fear. I had heard that we could bring a towel into the hot bath. However, I was told that it was so small it essentially covered nothing. Perhaps because it was never meant to be a tool for modesty, but to wrap around your head to keep your hair dry.

That didn’t stop us gaijins from trying though. In the changing room preluding to the actual onsen, we took the bigger towel not meant to be brought into the onsen. However, we were stopped by one of the staff who redirected us to the smaller towel. Abashedly, we obliged and were forced to reveal naked bodies to one another, with the small towel being of no help whatsoever.

The dash from the changing room to the onsen was humiliating. The more we tried to hide, the more pathetic it felt, especially when many other unfazed locals around us were leisurely strolling past us, stark naked and unashamedly showcasing their assets. Eventually, I got tired of keeping up the covering act and forced myself to maintain normal conversations with my friends. By the end of our baths, we too found ourselves casually strolling back to the changing room – as did the locals – not in any desperation to reunite with our clothes. Something about being stripped to absolutely nothing made for very intimate conversations. Moreover, the onsen environment really helped to facilitate deeper conversations, despite only having recently befriended the girls with me.

On hindsight, I am glad that the towel warden had stopped us from covering ourselves up with the big towels. If we had insisted on our own gaijin ways, we would never have had the true Japanese Onsen experience – in which expression of nudity was part of the package. 
By putting ourselves outside of our comfort zones, we maximized our experience here in Japan. The towel warden in that moment became the cultural enforcer, that taught us the value of “when in Rome, do as Romans do”. Participating in the process – entirely as it was meant to be – rather than bringing in our own cultural assumptions, beliefs of right and wrongs, is the first step to understanding any kind of society and group. Perhaps this is the very value of ethnography.


Another aspect I have heavily encountered in Japanese society is the excessive exposure to sexuality. Walking past a middle-aged man browsing a wide-opened A4-sized hentai manga big enough for the blind to see in the middle of the bustling Shibuya train platform was something I didn't see every day. Or, ever. Also, my hunt for generic otaku merchandise at Akihabara led me similar buildings with floors 5-7 reserved exclusively for mature audiences. Of course, in the name of science, I had to explore every nook and cranny on every floor. It was fascinating how overt pornographic materials were displayed. I even witnessed a museum-like room, where drawn naked girls were very professionally framed up.

This made me very curious as to the way sexuality and nudity operate in Japan. Most of the world had experienced western colonization for a sustained period of time - and with it, had received western-influenced religious values – enough for them to take some root in the fabric of moral society. Western religions often discourage sexuality. However, these western values never had enough traction to make a significant impact on moral society in Japan, that was and still is largely organized by Shinto and Buddhist principles. Shinto religion, on the other hand, is more open-minded to concepts of sexuality that focuses more on the importance of the divine power of deities (kami) rather than the moral actions of the individual. Even as Buddhism and Shintoism blend into Japanese beliefs, they often do not condemn most forms of sexuality.

The Japanese, therefore, abide by a different set of moral codes; where sexuality and nudity are not seen as inherently shameful. Of course, that does not mean that all Japanese people fully embrace it. Instead, I conceive that nudity and sexuality are viewed in the pragmatic lens as socially disruptive, less so viewed in the moral lens as inherently wrong.


Thursday 17 October 2019

The Wrong Approach to Counter-Terrorism

Written in the module GL2103: Global Governance. The title is pretty much self-explanatory; This essay argues for the misframing of global terrorism as a security issue, informing inappropriate and arguably counter-effective state-responses, calling for greater involvement of non-state actors. Grade: A-

The Wrong Approach to Counter-Terrorism 

“You don’t defeat terrorism by ripping up human rights”, said the British politician Jeremy Corbyn in response to the UK Prime Minister’s pledge to change human rights law should they compromise counter-terrorism operations. Since the wake of 9/11 in 2001, terrorism had been identified by the UN as an international threat and by many states a national threat. 17 years later, terrorism is still on the rise, leading many frustrated politicians like the UK Prime Minister to arrive at such desperate convictions.

In this essay, I argue that global terrorism has not been effectively addressed, due to the fact that it has been largely framed as a security issue, informing arguably state-centric counter-terrorism responses that are not only short term, but have a tendency to violate human rights, especially towards victims of radicalisation – counter-productive in addressing terrorism. Drawing on elements from Malaysia’s relatively successful counter-terrorism strategy, I will argue that effective and sustainable global governance of terrorism would require a reframing of terrorism beyond a ‘security issue’ and a greater inclusion of non-state actors.

Member states’ latest review of UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy was met with criticism by a Global Group of NGOs at its failure to appropriately address human rights, with its increased militarization of its counter-terrorism approaches, and its lack of civil society’s involvement.[1]
 Such a parochial state-centric and militarised approach are largely due to the fact that the terrorist narrative has been framed as a security issue. Terrorism operated in a new normative context when the US declared the “War on Terror”, giving a new weight and a dimension of security to words like “terrorists”, “extremists” and even “Islam” in the post-9/11 international community. Additionally, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was set up under the UN Security Council. Coined internationally as a security issue, it naturally informed militarised action, making states the main actors in countering terrorism because of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force, pushing many non-state actors such as human rights advocacy groups into the background within the counter-terrorism discourse.[2]

This state-centric, top-down approach fails to recognise that terrorism is not just an issue of state security; preventing terrorists from committing the crime, but a multi-stage process of manipulation, radicalisation, and even de-radicalisation for the perpetrators that need to be addressed. This “War on Terror” rhetoric blinds states from seeing “terrorists” as nothing more than that; as an enemy of the state, neglecting the reality that the driving forces of home-grown terrorism often share similar roots found in many other humanitarian crises in the form of poverty, social exclusion, and even globalisation.[3]
This disproportionate focus on security would lead to an ineffective channelling of resources and efforts, away from other long-term social and developmental issues that also desperately need to be addressed. Not only would this be ineffective, but it may also be counter-productive. With states as the predominant actor, it could, and they have, led to increased violations of human rights which states have previously committed themselves to. With a lack of non-state actors monitoring and keeping states accountable, governments can easily justify their human rights abuses and often do exploit the lack of public interest in human rights to be more oppressive in the face of terrorist threats.[4] UK’s controversial counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST was criticized for its failure to protect human rights, fuelling and reinforcing xenophobia and Islamophobia through discriminatory practices in the name of national security. Such tactless mistreatment in these counter-terrorism operations would only stoke more hostility between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, playing right into the hands of terrorist groups, backfiring the very thing they set out to do.

I will refer to Malaysia’s counter-terrorism strategy to see how then reframing the concept of terrorism and the inclusion of more actors might look like. Malaysia’s counter-terrorism efforts have been positively viewed by the international community. A plausible explanation of this is that contrary to UK’s hard stance toward terrorism, Malaysia conceptualised terrorism beyond a security matter, insisting that the fight against terror cannot be won through coercive and punitive measures alone. Instead, it emphasised its de-radicalisation programs as one of its main preventive methods to inhibit terrorist activity, with a success rate of 97.5%.[5] While this program was created in accordance to the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 requiring member states to devise a program to manage returning foreign terrorist fighters, Malaysia understood that many of these detainees were sole-breadwinners of their families, therefore adopting a “soft-approach”; with engagement policies prioritising the welfare of individuals and their families. Malaysia’s counter-terrorism strategy is on the right path, with a better conceptualisation of terrorism as more than just a security issue, informing more humane responses that tackle the deeper problem.

However, Malaysia was not free from criticism, and was condemned for its thoughtless detainment of suspects without a right to fair trial. While Malaysia had made attempts to incorporate more actors in its counter-terrorism strategy, efforts were still largely state-driven, and thus prone to human rights violations because of the lack of proper systems of accountability in place.

Drawing on this case study, I argue that global governance can better address terrorism by officially recognising more non-state actors in this counter-terrorism operation.
At the international level, despite successive UN Special Rapporteurs reminding member states to balance both counter-terrorism and human rights efforts, it has not been given enough attention. Therefore, NGOs should be recognised at the forefront of international counter-terrorism conferences to actively shape the international agenda in both areas of terrorism and human rights, instead of releasing ad-hoc statements criticising the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as the Global Group of NGOs did. This would shift the normative understanding of terrorism as merely a security issue; with a need to forcefully eliminate violent terrorist, to a more nuanced understanding of the issue that informs more effective solutions.

Governance at the international level is not enough. From a Channel News Asia interview, Malaysia, in comparison to the West, attributed its success to the advantage they have, that they could better understand and penetrate the Muslim community because they themselves were Muslims.[6] However, for other countries where the Muslim community is a minority, this calls for more communication and empathy at the grassroots level. Both NGOs and civil society play an important role at this local level in properly addressing the social causes for radicalisation that are unique to each society, where various factors such as demographics, politics, social inequality all play a part. Moreover, terror threats are more localised than ever, with non-state actors as the primary actor in terrorism. This calls for a constructive partnership with civil society that is often well-placed to identify and respond to these threats.[7] Local organisations and entities should be ready to hold states accountable to its human rights commitments, just as the leader of the opposition party Jeremy Corbyn had done. More bottom-up engagement would ensure a greater sustainable impact.

To conclude, this essay aims to problematize security as the highest and only priority in the governance of terrorism, resulting in ill-informed state-centric measures that are ineffective and counter-productive. Looking to Malaysia’s more nuanced and diverse counter-terrorism strategy, it suggests a need for more non-state actors in the global governance of terrorism at the international and local level to ensure effective operations while holding the state accountable in safeguarding human rights.  






Bibliography
Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. “Malaysia’s Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalisation Strategy.” Journal of Public Security and Safety Vol. 6 No. 2/2016. http://www.moha.gov.my/images/terkini/WORD.ARTIKEL-TPM-JURNAL-VOL.6-2016.pdfFoot, Rosemary. "Human Rights and Counterterrorism in Global Governance: Reputation and Resistance." Global Governance 11, no. 3 (2005): 291-310. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800573.
Global Group of NGOs. “Global Group of NGOs Deplore Lack of Attention to Human Rights inLatest Review of UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy by UN Member States.” (2018) https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/statement_gcts_review_20180710_final.pdf
Minear, Larry. “Humanitarian Action in an Age of Terrorism” (2002) http://www.unhcr.org/3d57aba71.pdf
Naidu, Sumisha. "Surge in Malaysia's Islamic State-linked Arrests; Official Explains Anti-terrorStrategy." Channel NewsAsia. October 23, 2017. Accessed November 07, 2018. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/surge-in-malaysia-s-islamic-state-linked-arrests-official-9324112.
Rosand, Eric. "Where Is Civil Society in the U.N.'s Counterterrorism Efforts?" Brookings.       May 15, 2018. Accessed November 06, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/15/where-is-civil-society-in-the-u-n-s-counterterrorism-efforts/.



[1]
Global Group of NGOs. Global Group of NGOs Deplore Lack of Attention to Human Rights in Latest Review of UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy by UN Member States. (2018) https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/statement_gcts_review_20180710_final.pdf
[2] Foot, Rosemary. Human Rights and Counterterrorism in Global Governance: Reputation and Resistance.
Global Governance 11, no. 3 (2005): 291-310. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800573.
[3]Larry Minear, Humanitarian Action in an Age of Terrorism (2002) http://www.unhcr.org/3d57aba71.pdf
[4] Foot, Human Rights and Counterterrorism[5] Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Malaysia’s Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalisation Strategy. Journal of Public Security and Safety Vol. 6 No. 2/2016. http://www.moha.gov.my/images/terkini/WORD.ARTIKEL-TPM-JURNAL-VOL.6-2016.pdf
[6]
 Sumisha Naidu, Surge in Malaysia's Islamic State-linked Arrests; Official Explains Anti-terror Strategy. Channel NewsAsia. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/surge-in-malaysia-s-islamic-state-linked-arrests-official-9324112.
[7] Eric Rosand, "Where Is Civil Society in the U.N.'s Counterterrorism Efforts?" Brookings. (May 15, 2018) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/15/where-is-civil-society-in-the-u-n-s-counterterrorism-efforts/.