This is a 4k word essay written by me in 2018 in the module PS3236: Ethnicity and Religion in Asian Politics. This essay argues for the irreconcilable nature of ethnopolitical and religious conflict in the Rohingya crisis at the national-state level that calls for a necessary intervention by international institutions, such as the United Nations. Grade: A-
A Need, A Must
“A bystander to genocide” was a
title awarded to the United States, and by extension, the United Nations, by
Samantha Powers for their response, or lack thereof, concerning the Rwandan genocide.[1] The
infamous failure of the United Nations (UN) to interfere with the ongoing onslaught of an entire Tutsi ethnic minority by the Hutu ethnic majority had left
a permanent scar in the UN’s peacekeeping track record and reinforced doubts of
the international organization’s role in managing ethnic conflict.
On a smaller scale, a similar
situation not too far from the atrocities of 1994 is increasingly sounding
alarm bells within the international community. The Rohingya crisis involving
the disenfranchisement and systematic oppression of the Rohingya ethnic
minority group by the Burmese state has been branded by the United Nations
Human Rights Chief, as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. [2]
This clash of ethnic groups, generating
heavy public discourse with terms like ethnic cleansing, human rights
violations, citizenship rights, nationality and even separatist suspicions are
referred by Ted Gurr as ethnopolitical conflicts. He characterizes two kinds of
distinct ethnopolitical groups – one of national
peoples and the other of minority
peoples. While national peoples often
seek exit that leads to separatist conflict and state repression, minority people desire access, through
more passive political means such as campaigns. [3] The
Rohinya falls within the spectrum of these two groups and find themselves the
protagonist of a complicated ethnopolitical conflict with great national, regional
and international implications.
This paper will argue that the
United Nations has a significant role to play in intervening ethnopolitical
tensions in the Rohingya crisis, and will attempt to justify why their
involvement is necessary due to (1) the enduring ethnic identity claims of the
Rohingya amidst rejection and oppression and (2) Myanmar’s weak democratic
political infrastructure exacerbating ethnic conflicts.
Gurr’s framework of managing
ethnopolitical conflict will be used to understand the nature of ethnic
conflict between the Burman Nationalists and Rohingya, and why the United
Nations should intervene.
It is important to note that although
this paper attempts to rationalize United Nations’ intervention in the Rohingya
crisis, the focus will not be an evaluation of UN’s structural qualities or
principles. Rather, it examines the way ethnopolitical group identity and
conflict is perceived and mobilized in existing infrastructures and
subsequently why the United Nations, as a capable third-party actor, can and
must interfere.
The paper also acknowledges that
the justification for intervention does not sufficiently take into account the
practical methods of which it is able to interfere. Instead, it assumes the
United Nations in its ideal state, as its Charter presents itself to be, again
reminding readers that the heart of this argument lies in fleshing out the
nature of ethnopolitical identity and conflict.
The Enduring Rohingya Identity
Despite being cursed with a
political predicament of statelessness, the Rohingya identity has been
increasingly salient and mobilized by its circumstances, warranting the aid and the attention of the allegedly apolitical and the morally acclaimed United Nations
organization respectively.
The Political
Plight: Stateless and Unwanted
The bone of contention lies in
the incompatibility of identity claims made by the Rohingya and the Burmese
state political authority. The Rohingya claim Burmese citizenship as “their
natural right”, entitled to all citizenship rights that includes state
protection.[4]
However, the new Citizenship Law passed in 1982 did not recognize the Rohingya
as a national ethnic group.[5] This
denial of citizenship effectively rendered the Rohingya people stateless. The
state insisted that they are “Bengali Muslims”, “illegal immigrants”, not ever
belonging in Myanmar’s history despite their inhabitance in Myanmar for many
generations.. [6] This is a
position still firmly maintained by the Myanmar government today.[7] The
official stance on their stateless status accelerated Burmans’ intolerance
towards the Rohingya, that eventually became the justification for rebellion by
certain Rohingyas – and for ethnic cleansing by the military juntas.
The armed attack by the insurgent
Rohingya organization, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 25
2017 triggered a large-scale military offense toward the Rohingya people –
innocent civilians included – that resulted in a mass exodus of Rohingya who
were seeking for refuge beyond the Myanmar border. The diaspora of the Rohingya
has been largely concentrated in Bangladesh, with an estimate of 328,000
Rohingya as documented and undocumented refugees. This outcome is not only due
to the military operation in 2017, but through episodes of influxes of Rohingya
fleeing into Bangladesh ever since 1978, when anti-Rohingya military campaigns
were held to condemn the them as illegal immigrants.
Yet, despite the Burman state
claiming their Bengali origin, this is inconsistent to Bangladesh’s stand.
Bangladesh claimed to have not officially known of this ethnic group until 1978
when they had first crossed the border, therefore rightfully labelled as
“refugees” and should be repatriated.[8] Although
the somewhat successful negotiations between the two governments on
repatriation saw through the return of 226,576 Rohingyas, Bangladesh still
experienced flashes of influx of Rohingya entering its borders, with some
Rohingya returning to Bangladesh after being repatriated. [9]
Unwanted in their home country and
unwelcomed in their host country, the Rohingya find themselves trapped in
statelessness and without a place to belong.
In an interview with Myanmar’s
ambassador to Bangladesh, Mr Phae Thann Oo admitted that “The Rohingyas are an
unfortunate issue between the two countries.” [10] With
neither wanting to include the Rohingya in their national identity, nor are
they equally likely to compromise their boundaries to meet the alternative
solution of an autonomous Rohingya zone, external pressure beyond the state
level is needed before any form of concession can take place.
In this case, the most compelling
form of foreign intervention is the United Nations international organization.
Thakur stated that the United Nation commands an authority from states because
it is a product of an “international political process of the assertion and
reconciliation of national interests”.[11]
Moreover, ethnic conflicts that
“spillover” to other inter-state relations concern international peace and
security that is enshrined in the UN Charter as part of the organization’s
responsibility to manage.[12]
Sentiments
that Run Deep
The Burman’s antagonism towards
the Rohingya is not merely reactionary to past arbitrary conflicts. Instead, it
was particularly the ethnic and religious quality of the Muslim community in
the northern Rakhine State, of which existed alongside the majority of Buddhist
Burmans, that was the basis of which the Rohingya identity was formed,
politicized and ultimately rejected. Yet it is ironic that Myanmar’s
increasingly explicit efforts to extinguish the Rohingya identity has led to a
greater salience of identity both inwardly within the Rohingya ethnic group and
outwardly in the international community.
The following section attempts to
explain for the enduring Rohingya identity vis-à-vis the Burman Buddhist
ethno-nationalist identity that serve to reinforce the ethnopolitical struggle.
It will first discuss the underlying perceptions of the Burmese towards the
Rohingya identity and argues that despite the Burmese pretense of a fear of a
disloyal ethnic identity, its historical incongruence and disproportionate
marginalization towards the Rohingya reveals a deeper force of islamophobia at
work. It will then analyze the Rohingya identity as a mobilizing and collective
force that endures even amidst its oppressive conditions. Lastly,
in understanding how the unreasonable extent of discrimination by the
Burmese and fervent refusal to concede by the Rohingya mutually reinforce ethnic
conflict, it is a recipe for severe and prolonged destruction that justifies
the response of the United Nations as an avowedly moral organization.
a.
The Rohingya Identity: Issues of
Loyalty or Just Islamophobia
The Myanmar government’s official
position does not acknowledge the term “Rohingya”. In the words of Mr. Phae
Thann Oo, “The so-called ‘Rohingyas’ for you… [but] not for us. For us, they
are Bengali Muslims”. [13]
In an effort to nationalize and
unify into a modern state, one can rationalize that this reluctance to
recognize and grant these ethnic minority groups more autonomy stems from the
reasonable fear that concession to the increasing demand for self-government would
encourage more ambitious and demanding behavior by the ethnic minorities,
possibly leading to complete independence. This would create a greater security
risk for the state. [14]
This suspicion of disloyalty
towards ethnic minority groups has colonial roots in Burma’s pre-independent
days. Well before independence in 1948, Burma has been at odds with its diverse
minorities concerning the consolidation of political power. In a move to
achieve Burma’s independence, anti-colonial Burman nationalists briefly aided
Japan’s conquest during the World War 2 while ethnic minority groups remained
loyal to its British colonial masters, creating tensions.[15] Moreover,
Burman nationalists have additional reason to be weary as some North Arakan
Muslims leaders requested to join Pakistan (but were rejected) and others
making ethnic claims to the British and Burmese authorities in 1948 to request
for more political autonomy.[16]
However, this does not explain
for the exceptional discrimination directed specifically towards the Rohingya
ethnic minority group. This situation is not so different from the Karen ethnic
minority group who supported the British[17] and
rebelled against the lack of self-determinism provided in the constitution
during 1947.[18]
And yet, the Karen people is legally recognized as an ethnic group while the
Rohingyas are not.
The difference lies beyond the
purported reasons of ethnic disloyalty or secessionist tendencies, but that of
race and religion. This racial and religious quality characterizes the Rohingya
identity into one that, amidst the backdrop of a differing state religion, is
underserving of national inclusion.
Andrew Selth viewed that
religious tension was always present in the Burmese political landscape. The
rise of Buddhist nationalism led to the making of Buddhism as the state
religion in 1960 and the 1962 military coup and regime that abrogated the 1947
constitution – and with it the full rights for Muslims. Chris Lewa agrees, explaining
that the ramifications of a prevailing Buddhist nationalism is a strong
anti-Muslim sentiment, “frightened … of losing traditional superiority” [19]
These physical and religious traits
of the Rohingya people become overtly problematized through discriminatory
policies and national rhetoric. This ironic oppression of identity, as
explained by Ted Gurr, becomes a “strong source of group cohesion”.[20]
This paper has discussed in great
detail of how the Rohingya identity is perceived and acted upon by external
actors such as the Burmese government, Burmese nationalists and the Bangladesh
government. However, the next section aims to give voice to the agentic
Rohingya community (contrary to contemporary media framing them as abjectly helpless)
in order to understand why the Rohingya identity is still surviving despite the
odds stacked against them.
b.
The Rohingya Identity: Mobilized
In rationalizing why ethnic
minority groups rebel, Ted Gurr describes the salience of identity and incentives
for political action such as ethnopolitical frames and repression, as key
factors in contributing to the Rohingya’s psyche of resistance.
Firstly, several traits such as
physical attributes (or ‘race’), religion and language, have been linked to
durable collective identities have explicitly been the justification for many
for the distinct and unwelcomed Rohingya identity today. These particularly
salient characteristics have also been heavily emphasized even from the early
days. Jacques Leider mentioned that “the criteria that prevailed in the first
reports [of the Rohingya] were religious identity (“Muslim”) and linguistic
group (“Bengali”).”[21] However,
this perspective suffers from being too primordial as these simplified
characteristics are assumed as inherent and sufficient in drawing immutable
boundaries for the Rohingya collective. A case against this logic is the
reality of the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Although the Rohingya share identical
culture and religion with the Bengali,[22] they
are still outcasted.
A greater force is at play
distinguishing the Rohingya ethnic identity from its neighbors. Gurr points to
another factor, the shared incentives for political action, that inspire and
motivate greater political mobilization of the Rohingya as a collective entity.
The associations to the Rohingya
identity – one of a people denied of citizenship – has not always been the driving force of Rohingya political action. In
the 1950s, the Rohingyas fought not for acknowledgement as citizens, as the 1947
constitution had offered them this access. But rather, they had wanted to be
recognized as a national race to claim their own political autonomy.[23] Despite
rejection by authorities, these ethnopolitical desires are further intensified within
the Rohingya political imagination through frameworks that empower and
mobilize.
Perhaps a surprise to many is
that the term Rohingya is very recent.
This name entered public discourse after its unsuccessful political appeal in
the 1950s for state recognition. Gurr explained that in times of injustice or
grievances, these “frames” serve as cognitive understandings to process these
feelings and become the centre for social activity. Likewise, analyzing the
context of which it emerged, the same could be understood of the Rohingya
identity as a frame for Muslims in the Rakhine State. While earlier documented
accounts mentioned the “Rooinga”, a piece of evidence often used to proof the
indigenous Muslim ethnic community’s existence,[24] the
term “Rohingya” (of which was a derivative or “Rooinga”) was a more
encompassing muslim identity and identification process. Leider described the
Rohingya as embodying “an ongoing process of identity formation” that
effectively unified Muslim communities in the North Arakan region who shared
similar cultural profile despite having diverse historical backgrounds. Some
were members of the old Muslim community known as the “Arakan Mahomedans” and
the larger and more recent Muslim community were referred to as the
“Chittagons” who settled n then-Burma due to colonization forces and the
opening of the Suez Canal. [25] (#25,6) The name Rohingya was used as a tool to assert a distinct ethnoreligious
identity. Key mobilizing actors like the Muslim leaders and the students in
North Arakan began leveraging on this term. This rebranded concept gave Muslim
nationalists a self-identifying term and a semblance of unity that they did not
have in the 1950s.
Inwardly, a unifying identity has
been internalized. Outwardly, the Rohingya increased their efforts in English
language media, and less in the Burmese language, to publicly champion their
Muslim nationalist movement. In merging their ethnic and historical claims with
their political goals, they mirror the causes of other rebelling ethnic
minority groups who were similarly seeking for recognition and an autonomous
territory, using them as points of references for greater ethnopolitical action. [26]
Yet, arguably, the most
compelling unifying force is the perceived unjust and repressive control
towards the Rohingya by the state that incentivizes a greater ethnopolitical
response. Generally, the use of force in the short run may generate fear or
caution, but it may stir resentment and “enduring incentives to resist and
retaliate” in the long term. True enough, sustained discriminatory policies and
the outright persecution of the Rohingya have led to a greater hardening of identity
and greater conviction for the movement – domestically and internationally.[27] Although
previously indifferent to the way they were labelled, years of oppression combined
with little legal recognition made many Muslims in the Rakhine state unhappy. Derek
Mitchell, a U.S ambassador to Burma serving from 2012 to 2016, said that
activists and leaders in the Rohingya community are very “protective” of that
name (Rohingya), of their identity
and dignity after countless human rights had been robbed from them in recent
years.[28] Director
of the Arakan Project, Chris Lewa, stated that Muslim minorities continue to
“consolidate under one Rohingya identity”, despite reports of “systematic
disenfranchisement, violence and instances of anti-Muslim campaigns”[29]
The above section has striven to
analyze, at a deeper level, the underlying forces that drive perceptions of the
Rohingya identity from both the Burman nationalists’ and the Rohingya’s point
of view. It reaches the conclusion that therein exists a deep emotional sentiment,
with the racist and Islamophobic reaction towards the Rohingya people and the
intensified mobilization of the ethnoreligious identity despite prolonged
suffering, that serves as the basis of which ethnopolitical action and conflict arises. However, the nature of the conflict is one that
cannot be rationally resolved by either party who are both scarred with long-standing
resentment from strong prejudices, bitterness and a lack of trust. Engaged in a
self-generating cycle of greater oppression and greater resistance, the United
Nations’ claim to be “acting in the interest of mankind” presupposes a fair and
neutral position that legitimizes a rightful authority to intervene. Moreover,
it would undoubtedly cause even greater human rights violations, as ethnic
conflicts often do, which again means that the United Nations – founded upon
principles of human rights protection – cannot remain completely indifferent to
ethnic conflict.
Weak Political Infrastructure
Gurr characterizes state power as
a “durable opportunity factor” in ethnopolitical conflicts. The state’s
political infrastructures are an important factor that determines the capability
of the ethnopolitical group to pursue their objectives and likewise the
response of the state to these ethnopolitical requests.[30] The
following section seeks to understand the political structure of the Myanmar state
and how it escalated ethnic tensions to the point of state-sanctioned military
attacks that are still taking place today, demanding international
intervention.
Democracy is often glorified as
the panacea, and even more so in multicultural and multiethnic societies
because of its openness and accommodation towards diverse interests. Ideally,
this system would represent and endorse equality for all groups – minorities
included. Democracy, however, has had a complicated presence in Myanmar’s
history. This quasi-democratic structure not only denies the Rohingya minority
but exacerbates ethnopolitical tension, which all the more emphasizes the need
for international intervention.
Although granted independence in
1948 as a democratic nation, it was quickly replaced by the military
totalitarian regime not long after from a staged coup, ushering in the reign of
the military junta for 23 years until 2011. It set up the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) that essentially acted as the veto power, handing
its power over to selected elected parties to govern Myanmar.[31] Democracy
was largely pushed into the shadows, hardly playing any significant role at the
government level. This was so until the 2015 general elections where the
National League for Democracy party overwhelmingly won, installing the
country’s first non-military president in 54 years. Despite hopes of many for greater
state support for ethnic minority groups, in particular the Rohingya, critics
identify a reluctance by the now de-facto democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi to
advocate for the Rohingya cause. It is posited that her fear of alienating the
majority Buddhist nationalist would threaten the power-sharing relations
between the civilian government and the military.
Gurr’s framework of
ethnopolitical action concerning a weak democratic autocracy does not exactly
hold in the case of the democratic Myanmar government – democratic, at least, in name. Although it is arguably a
country with fairly new democratic powers in place, this form of democracy is
still very much subservient to the coercion of the military.
In fact, democracy had been
counter-effective to the Rohingya cause. The International Crisis Group
outlined two levels of struggle taking place in Myanmar’s political history.
The democracy movement at the centre that have been overwhelmingly championed
by Buddhist Burmans and the ethnic nationalist movement at the periphery of the
country, led by ethnic minority groups who were more so against discrimination than
against authoritarianism.[32]
The democratic structure thus finds
more favor in satiating the majority of Buddhist Burmans at the centre, who
were actively shaping a Buddhist-based vision, and anti-Muslim, vision of the
country. The International Crisis Group also reported that “country-wide
anti-Muslim sentiment” along with the exploitation of the democratic system had
made it “politically difficult for the government” to make policies that were
“supportive of Muslim rights”.[33]
It does not render Gurr’s point
of that the nature of autocratic democracy was a determinant of the extent of
durable opportunities available for ethnopolitical action. In fact, it sheds
new light to the complicated and almost barren opportunities present for the
Rohingya in its domestic country, deserving of greater opportunities driven at
the international level.
Moreover, the result of an obscure democratic state is an impunity deeply entrenched in its political and legal system. The Myanmar government has violently denied allegations of committing ethnic cleansing and human rights violations despite an influx of reports by the United Nations, media sources and the Rohingya themselves on the systematic and grotesque use of violence, rape and mass killing. Instead, blame is pushed to the multiple culprits and circumstances, such as the lack of trained soldiers and even the Rohingya who it claimed torched their own houses. These baseless claims earned warnings from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein to “stop pretending”.[34] The complete denial of this grossly disproportionate reality by the uncooperative Myanmar government combined with the disastrous democratic infrastructure thus demands an even higher authority, appropriately the United Nations.
This paper has thus striven to unravel
the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts. It justifies the United Nation’s role
of intervention due to the firstly, an enduring Rohingya identity that has
suffered politically as statelessness and unwanted but at the same time
prevailed in prominence as an identity and a political process despite many
obstacles. Real political stakes coupled with the deep emotional vein reveals a
desperate need for third party intervention that is generally viewed as
politically neutral and morally superior. Finally, it explores the democratic
situation in Myanmar to evaluate the capacities and opportunities for the
Rohingya and concludes that the severely un-democratic model plagued with
political immunity necessitates a higher authority. Therefore, the United
Nations needs to, and must intervene in the Rohingya crisis.
Bibliography
Calamur, Krishnadev. "The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's
Rohingya Crisis." The Atlantic.
September 30, 2017. Accessed April 03,
2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/.
Farzana, Kazi Fahmida.
"Conclusion." Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees, 2017, 233-
47.
Green, Penny. "Islamophobia: Burma's Racist
Fault-line." SAGE
Journals.
Gurr, Ted. “Minorities and
Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the
New
Century,” Turbulent Peace: The Challenge
of Managing International Conflict (2001), pp. 163-87.
Hunt, Katie. "Rohingya Crisis: How
We Got Here." CNN. November 13, 2017. Accessed
Khan, Mohammed Abu Sayed Arfin, Sharif Ahmed Mukul, Mohammed
Salim Uddin,
Mohammad Golam Kibria, and Fahmida
Sultana. "The Use of Medicinal Plants in Healthcare Practices by Rohingya
Refugees in a Degraded Forest and Conservation Area of Bangladesh." International Journal of Biodiversity Science &
Management5, no. 2
(2009): 76-82. doi:10.1080/17451590902978855.
Khin, Tun. "Rohingya: A Preventable
Genocide Allowed to Happen." Insight Turkey.
October 01, 2017.
Accessed April 03, 2019. https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/rohingya-a-preventable-genocide-
allowed-to-happen.
Leider, Jacques. "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim
Identity in Myanmar." Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Asian History.
July 19, 2018. Accessed April 03, 2019. http://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-115.
"Myanmar: A New
Peace Initiative | Crisis Group." ( 2011) Accessed April 3, 2019.
initiative
Nebehay, Stephanie. "U.N. Brands Myanmar Violence a
'textbook' Example of Ethnic
Cleansing." Reuters. September
11, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/u-n-brands-myanmar-violence-a-textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing-idUSKCN1BM0QF.
Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to
Genocide." The Atlantic. March 31, 2017. Accessed April
Ryan, Stephen. "Ethnic Conflict and the United
Nations." Ethnic and Racial
Studies13, no. 1
(1990): 25-49.
doi:10.1080/01419870.1990.9993660.
Ullah, Akm Ahsan. "Rohingya
Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and
Contemporary
Marginalization." Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies9, no. 2 (2011):
139-61. doi:10.1080/15562948.2011.567149.
"What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya
Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations.
Accessed April 03, 2019.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.
[1] Samantha Powers, "Bystanders to Genocide." The Atlantic. March 31, 2017.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/.
[2] Stephanie Nebehay, "U.N. Brands
Myanmar Violence a 'textbook' Example of Ethnic Cleansing." Reuters.
September 11, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/u-n-brands-myanmar-violence-a-textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing-idUSKCN1BM0QF.
[3] Ted Gurr, “Minorities and
Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the
New Century,” Turbulent
Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict (2001), pp. 163-87,
164.
[4] Kazi Fahmida Farzana, "Conclusion." Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees,
2017, 233-47, 60.
[5] Tun Khin, "Rohingya: A Preventable Genocide
Allowed to Happen." Insight Turkey, 47
https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/rohingya-a-preventable-genocide-allowed-to-happen.
[6] Farzana, "Conclusion."
Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees, 60.
[7] Katie Hunt, "Rohingya Crisis: How We Got Here." CNN. November 13,
2017. Accessed April 03, 2019.
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/12/asia/rohingya-crisis-timeline/index.html.
[8] Akm Ahsan Ullah, "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh:
Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization." Journal of
Immigrant & Refugee Studies 9, no. 2 (2011): 139-61.
[9] Akm Ahsan Ullah, "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh:
Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization."
[10] Akm Ahsan Ullah, "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh:
Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization."
[11] Stephen Ryan, "Ethnic Conflict and the United
Nations." Ethnic and Racial Studies13, no. 1 (1990): 25-49.
doi:10.1080/01419870.1990.9993660.
[12] Ryan, "Ethnic Conflict and the United
Nations.", 30
[13] Khan, Mohammed Abu Sayed Arfin, Sharif Ahmed Mukul,
Mohammed Salim Uddin, Mohammad Golam Kibria, and Fahmida Sultana. "The Use of Medicinal Plants in
Healthcare Practices by Rohingya Refugees in a Degraded Forest and Conservation
Area of Bangladesh." International Journal of Biodiversity Science
& Management5, no. 2 (2009): 76-82. doi:10.1080/17451590902978855.
[14] Re Kazi Fahmida Farzana, "Conclusion." Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees,
2017, 233-47, 13.
Accessed April 3, 2019.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-new-peace-initiative
[16] Jacques Leider, "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim
Identity in Myanmar." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History,
60.
[17] Leider, "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim
Identity in Myanmar”, 61
[18] "Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative | Crisis Group.", 2.
[20] Ted Gurr, “Minorities and
Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the
New Century,” Turbulent
Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict (2001), pp. 163-87,
168.
[21] Leider, "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim
Identity in Myanmar”, 6.
[22] Akm Ahsan Ullah, "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh:
Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization”, 3.
[25] Leider, "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim
Identity in Myanmar”, 6
[26] Leider, "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim
Identity in Myanmar”, 10
[27] Ted Gurr, “Minorities and
Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the
New Century”, 170
[28] Krishnadev Calamur,
"The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis." The Atlantic. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/.
[29] "What Forces Are
Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.
[30] Ted Gurr, “Minorities and
Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the
New Century,” Turbulent
Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict (2001), pp. 163-87,
174
[31] "Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative | Crisis Group.", 1.
[32] Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative | Crisis Group.", 12.
[33] "What Forces Are
Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.
[34] Krishnadev Calamur,
"The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis." The Atlantic.
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/.
No comments:
Post a Comment